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•  Budgetsand  ecesslons 
This must be the first year that the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers has flatly 
predicted a recession -certainly  the firsttime 
any Council has predicted a recession in an 
election year. Strangely, this recession 
forecast comes at a time when many private 
forecasters are beginning to back away from 
earlier recession warnings, at least partly 
because of  the substantial increase in defense 
spending called for in the President's budget 
message. But many other analysts claim that a 
recession is still likely because the budget, in 
overall terms, is becoming increasingly 
restrictive. 
The one certain thing is the uncertainty of 
forecasts-budgetary and otherwise-in the 
present economic and political climate. For 
one notable example, the deficit for the 1980 
fiscal year, originally projected at $29 billion, 
is now likely to reach $40 billion or even 
more. (The famous spending "shortfalls" of 
several earlier years are now but a memory.) 
Similarly, the projected FY81  figures-a 
$16-billion deficit with total spending of 
$616 billion-may also be outdistanced by 
events. 
Stimulus vs. restriction 
Generally, a deficit is considered stimulative 
because it adds to the income stream of  the 
private economy, whereas a surplus is 
considered restrictive because it represents a 
net absorption of income from the private 
sector. However, the most relevant figures for 
this purpose are not the "actual" dollar 
figures, such as the projected deficits of 
$28 billion in 1979, $40 billion in 1980 and 
$16 bi  II ion in 1981 . Rather, to compare the 
fiscal effect on the same basis from year to 
year, economists use the "high-
employment" budget concept, which 
assumes that the economy is constantly 
running at the same level of employment. 
This approach requires certain adjustments, 
to compensate for the fact (for example) that 
revenues increase as fewer people become 
unemployed, while spending declines as less 
is paid out for unemployment-compensation 
benefits. 
On this high-employment basis, the budget 
wou  Id become progressively more restrictive 
under the existing tax structure. Specifically, 
it would shift from a $12-billion deficit in 
fiscal 1979 to a modest surplus of $4 billion 
in 1980 and a much larger surplus of 
$57 billion in 1981  (see chart). All else being 
equal, the economy would generate 
significantly more revenues at full' 
employment, outstripping projected 
expenditures this year and next. It should be 
noted, however, that government analysts 
use a benchmark unemployment rate of 
5.1  percent when computing the 
high-employment budget whereas many 
studies indicatethatthe rate more compatible 
with a nonaccelerati  ng rate of  inflation wou  Id 
be closer to 6.0 percent. If  a figure ofthattype 
were used in the computation, the 
high-employment budget probably would 
remain in deficit in fiscal 1980 and would 
show a much smaller surplus in 1981, 
although the general movement would still 
be in the direction of restrictiveness. 
The actual budget figures-not the 
hypothetical "high employment" figures-
are important for the credit markets, where 
most of  the deficit is financed. The Treasury 
must compete for funds in the credit markets, 
like any other would-be borrower, but it is a 
very formidable competitor there because it 
can offer relatively risk-free debt instruments. 
When the Treasury runs a substantial deficit, 
it can thus generate a "crowding out" effect, 
denying full access to credit to other 
prospective borrowers. But that point aside, 
the "high employment" concept is a 
powerful tool for analyzing the economic 
effects of budget trends -and by that 
standard, the current figures indicate an 
increasingly restrictive budget stance for the 
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Toward stimulus? 
Still, the proposed restrictive budget could 
turn stimulative if  the political economy 
generates a substantial tax cut in this election 
year. The prospects, of  course, depend on just 
how weak the economy becomes as the year 
goes on. The unemployment rate jumped 
from 5.9 to 6.2 percent ofthe civilian labor 
force in January, and if  that movement 
continues, the demand for stimulative tax 
cuts might increase over time. 
The trend toward increased stimulus could be 
even greater on the expenditure side, given 
the pressures to expand spending for defense 
and energy purposes, not to mention social-
welfare programs. Defense outlays are. 
scheduled to rise by $15.3 billion in 1981, to 
$142.7 billion. The U.S~ in the pasttwo years 
has already met its NATO commitment to 
increase defense spending by 3 percent 
annually in real terms. In fiscal 1981, 
however, it plans to go beyond that and 
increase real spending by 5 percent, in 
. response to the Middle East crisis. The budget 
calls for development work on the new MX 
land-based missile, expansion of  the Trident 
missile-submarine program, and perhaps 
most important, the build-up of a ready 
deployment force to deal with trouble spots 
around the world. This 5-year, $9-billion 
program will require support equipment as 
varied as cargo planes and tankers and navy 
ships to be "pre-positioned" with combat 
equipment and supplies. 
Spending on energy programs is expected to 
rise only about 5 percent in fiscal 1981, to 
about $8.1  billion. However, the Administra-
tion also has earmarked almost one-third of 
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its requested new obligational authority for a 
variety of  energy-related programs-
programs as diverse as the strategic 
petroleum reserve, heating-bill assistance for 
low-income families, and transportation 
energy conservation. Meanwhile, to help 
offset the added costs of  defense and energy, 
the Administration has outlined potential 
savings in a number of areas, such as the 
hospital cost-containment program, reform 
of  the student-loan program, and reform of 
military and civilian pay schedules. But 
action is not certain, because at least some of 
these proposed cutbacks would tequire new 
legislation. 
Today vs. yesterday 
The present economic situation differs 
considerably-from-the-Iast defense build-up 
of 1966-68. In that earl ier period, the nation's 
physical plant and labor force were fully 
employed, even though the inflation rate 
averaged only about 3.7 percent annually. 
But the decisions taken then - to fund the 
social programs enacted in the mid-1960's, 
to expand defense expenditures 
substantially, and to do all this without 
levying new taxes to keep aggregate demand 
in check-together laid the groundwork for 
the severe inflation of the past 1  5 years. 
The current situation is much more delicate. 
On the one hand, the inflation rate is higher 
now than at practically any other time of  the 
past generation. This suggests the need for 
greater budgetary restraint. On the other 
hand, the economy is sluggish and on the 
pointof  recession, which precludes the use of 
additional taxes to fund defense spending. 
Indeed, a tax cut ordinarily would be in order to stimulate the economy, except that a tax 
cut at this juncture appears likely only to 
generate more inflation, especially if  the 
resulting deficit is accommodated by the 
monetary authorities. 
Stagflation? 
In general, continued stagflation may be the 
most likely outcome, given the current 
economic climate and the increasingly 
restrictive stance of  fiscal and monetary 
policy. This picture comes out clearly in the 
1980-81 forecasts produced by both the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) and the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO). Both groups of  forecasters expect a 
decline in real GNP in calendar 1980-a 
drop of 1.0 percent for the CEA and a drop of 
1.3 percent fortheCBO. (All comparisons 
are on a fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter 
basis.) Again, both expect only a modest 
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recovery in 1981, with real growth of  only 2.8 
to 3.0 percent. Consequently, they expect 
unemployment to increase; indeed, the CBO 
expects the jobless rate to rise over both 
years, reaching 8.0 percent in the final 
quarter of 1981 . 
At the same time, both organizations expect 
only modest progress against inflation over 
this two-year period. Even the CEA, the more 
optimistic of  the two groups, expects an 
8.6-percent increase in 1981  in the GNP 
deflator-the broadest measure of price 
change-compared with the 9.1-percent 
increase of 1979. The imbedded natu re of  the 
underlying inflation, plus continued price 
shocks from the OPEC cartel, make for very 
sober forecasts, and thereby provide a strong 
argument against stimulative policies. 
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Two  Budget  Measures BANKING DATA-TWELfTH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted)  total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time depositS - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
yearago@ 
Dollar  Percent 
+  16,278  +  13.50 
+  16,220  +  16.50 
+  3,947  +  13.70 
+  8,633  +  24.40 
+  4,196  +  20.60 
- 170  - 11.00 
- 481  - 6.30 
+  986  +  6.80 
+  3,308  +  8.30 
+  1,490  +  5.00 
- 1,661  .  5.50 
+  8,236  +  16.10 
+  9,060  +  21.90 
+  2,538  +  13.30 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ l/Net borrowed( -) 
Federal funds - Seven large Banks 
Net interbank transactions 
[Purchases (+  )/Sales (-)] 
Net, U.5. Securities dealer transactions 
[Loans (+  )/Borrowings (-)] 
* Excludes trading account securities. 







1/16/80  year-ago period 
68  27 
208  73 
139  - 100 
+1,807  +1,243 
68  +  583 
@ Historical data are not strictly comparable due to changes in the reporting panel; however, adjustments 
have been applied to 1978 data to remove as much as possible the effects of the changes in coverage. In 
addition, for some items, historical data are not available due to definitional changes. 
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